Conclusions and Way Ahead
An approach to BPC for combating WMD is defined at the strategic level as a mix of types of activities that collectively address
combating WMD ends in a region. Successful partner capacity building uses the right mix of activities, sequenced in the most appropriate way as to allow for the sustainability of the capacity
provided. To ensure the approach will have the desired effects, DoD should pursue a number of reinforcing activities. First, it is critical for U.S. policymakers and program managers to develop
and implement an effective and coordinated strategic communications plan that will reinforce key concepts. An effective communications strategy should include listening to the partner country’s views (For example, DTRA and the Marshall
Center conducted a workshop in November 2007 for Black Sea littoral partners in an effort to better understand the perspectives and needs of the partners for combating WMD proliferation). Second,
DoD planners and program managers should create and take advantage of opportunities to collaborate at the planning level. And third, it is important to make clear linkages between strategic
desired end states and functional plans.
This monograph has outlined and then applied a process for developing regional approaches to build partner capacity for combating
WMD. We have focused on the following four steps :
* Identifying capabilities and
desired end states relative to the WMD threat
* Working with potential
* Identifying relevant BPC ways
* Developing a framework to assess the effectiveness of BPC activities.
Recommendations for implementing this approach can be linked to seven key themes that will serve to guide DoD BPC for combating WMD
efforts. These themes include improving guidance, increasing visibility of ongoing activities at a global level, improving coordination, encouraging collaboration and implementation, conducting
assessments, and securing resources. Recommendations for implementing each of the four steps are provided below and linked to the seven key themes.
Identifying Desired End States and Capabilities Relative to Threats
Identifying desired end
states and capabilities relies on having good guidance
understanding of the nature of the WMD threat in each of the COCOM subregions. These insights will help planners focus security cooperation resources on the right capabilities for the right
reasons in the most effective ways, according to OSD and COCOM guidance. After the combating WMD desired end states relative to the WMD threats are determined, it is important to identify the
required key capabilities.
1. Planners and program managers should ensure that combating WMD programs address OSD guidance and COCOM
All activities should support at least one of the major desired end states identified in OSD or COCOM guidance, and the linkages to
that guidance should be clearly articulated.
2. Regular planning sessions among the various DoD functional and regional planners and program managers would help to ensure
adherence to the guidance and also ensure that COCOM requirements are met in the most effective and efficient ways.
This can be accomplished through regular planning sessions with program managers to ensure that activities are deconflicted and gaps
3. Planners should develop memorandums of understanding or internal operating instructions that formalize roles and relationships,
for example, between DTRA, STRATCOM, and the SCC.
4. It might be worthwhile to hold, perhaps on a monthly basis, country-specific or functionally focused (e.g., border security)
working groups, in which all program managers conducting activities with that country share ideas on (a) current capabilities under development, (b) desired end states being pursued, and (c) any
lessons from recent activities about which others should be aware. Such a forum could produce country-specific or functionally focused plans that clearly link to GEF and COCOM desired end states.
OSD could organize such meetings, or they could be held by the support agencies.
Working with Potential Partners
Working with partners relies
on an understanding of the partner’s capacity and willingness, and also on an understanding of the nature of the U.S. relationship. The effectiveness of U.S. BPC activities is in large part
reliant on the synergy between various programs that are undertaken, often independently of each other, with a given country or within a region. Close coordination
between DoD and
broader U.S. government activities will enable program managers to more effectively reinforce key concepts of combating WMD with U.S. partners, in a reinforcing way that builds the capacity of
partners to combat WMD threats.
1. DoD should focus on the partners that are most relevant to a specific WMD threat, as discussed in Chapter Three. Appropriate
partner roles can be determined by identifying the willingness of a potential partner to work with the United States and its current capacity to combat WMD threats. Planners should apply and, if
necessary, consider the capacity and willingness criteria developed in Chapter Four and expand on them as needed, based on insights from the Intelligence Community and regional experts. The key
is to determine a country’s overall capacity and willingness to combat WMD threats, and then be creative to develop the best approach to working with that specific country to meet U.S. and
partner needs. The best approach may be, in some cases, to work through a third party in a BPC context.
2. Greater emphasis should be placed on coordinating with other U.S. government agencies when partners are more willing to work
directly with the United States. DoD participation in international working groups, including donor conferences and clearinghouses such as the South Caucasus and Africa Clearinghouses (in which
both the UK and France take part), is important especially when it comes to countries that do not wish to work directly with the United States on combating WMD issues.
External coordination could uncover new opportunities to collaborate with other agencies, particularly the State Department (i.e.,
the EXBS program) and DOE (i.e., the SLD program), to leverage other activities and avoid duplication of effort. Other examples include spin-off events from PSI and GICNT, as well as BPC for
combating WMD activities sponsored by such organizations as the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, NATO, SHAPE, the European Union, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the Asia Regional Forum, and the Organization of American States.
3. DoD planners should seek to attend interagency working groups, such as the “deconfliction meetings” held by the State
Department’s Europe and Eurasia Coordinator’s Office, and other for a for discussing security cooperation activities that have a combating WMD objective. Another venue for such coordination is
the semi-annual SOCOM Global Synchronization Conference, which is augmented by frequent “community of interest” video teleconference discussions that include DoD and other interagency
stakeholders.2 Planners might encourage STRATCOM and/or SCC to hold similar conferences, or at least video teleconferences, specifically on combating WMD.
4. UNSCR 1540 country
reports, available on the United Nations Web site (United Nations Security Council, 2007), provide valuable insights into potential partner needs from the partner country’s
perspective. A better understanding of a partner’s self-identified capability needs relative to the threat will help to ensure that DoD programs are focused on the right issues.
Identifying Ways and Means to Build Partner Capacity to Combat WMD
The various ways of building
partner capacity can be organized along a spectrum to create a building block approach. Where the United States engages a partner along this spectrum is directly related to the nature of the U.S.
relationship with a partner country. Wider visibility
into the specific
ways and means pursued by other DoD entities, U.S. agencies, allies, and international and regional organizations will help program managers determine what might be the most appropriate approach
at a given time. During the COCOM workshops held for this study, one recurring observation was the need for various programs and activities to work together and complement each other; such an
effort would not be possible without a better understanding of what those programs and activities are and which agencies manage and execute them.
1. Program managers and planners should consider the current state of the U.S. relationship with a given country — i.e., crawl,
walk, or run — to identify how DoD programs can be used most appropriately.
2. Program managers and planners should continue to monitor COCOM, service-level (especially the Army’s ARGOS and the Air Force’s
Knowledgebase systems), and other agencies’ databases that track and assess security cooperation activities. The OSD–Joint Staff initiative to develop a BPC portal information sharing network may
be the best opportunity to share data on programs and activities, and to gain visibility on activities conducted by other agencies within DoD and eventually among interagency
3. Planners should expand their participation in COCOM theatre security cooperation working groups by briefing their specific
combating WMD programs whenever possible. Increased permanent representation at the geographic COCOMs from a variety of DoD entities would also help to ensure that BPC capabilities are fully
realized and utilized at the COCOM level.
4. Program managers and planners should seek to gain visibility into service- and National Guard–level activities on BPC for
combating WMD. One example is the Army CMEP tabletop exercises and council meetings in the Balkans. Other Army specific Title 10 programs—such as staff talks, scientific exchanges, and the
like—can also have a BPC for combating WMD element. In addition, the Army and Air National Guard SPP may be an ideal partner for DTRA. In FY 2008, SPP was allocated $10 million (an increase of
about $8 million annually) to support program activities, which generally include workshops and information exchanges. SPP certainly is well within its authority to focus some events on combating
5. Program managers and
planners should seek to take advantage of collaboration
These include supporting another agency’s activities, perhaps as a voluntary observer at first. When DoD program managers identify a collaborative opportunity, they should ensure that OSD and
COCOM combating WMD desired end states are included, especially since collaboration typically involves the sharing of event resources, and therefore objectives.
In this regard, it would be helpful to place greater emphasis on collaborating with other U.S. government agencies and international
working groups, such as donor conferences and clearinghouses. DoD should consider supporting other U.S. government agency events, such as the DHS CSI, State Department EXBS program, and DOE SLD
program workshops and various training sessions for which DoD expertise can be most effectively utilized.
It would also be beneficial for a varity of DoD planners and program managers to support COCOM bilateral and multilateral exercises
on BPC for combating WMD—such as FLEXIBLE RESPONSE (EUCOM), PANAMAX (SOUTHCOM), REGIONAL COOPERATION (CENTCOM), TEMPEST EXPRESS (PACOM), and GOLDEN SPEAR (AFRICOM)—and to support NATO exercises
in the EUCOM area of responsibility, such as those conducted by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center. Finally, it is important to involve civilian and military organizations
from both the United States and the partner.
Developing an Assessment Framework
As discussed in Chapter Five,
DoD currently does not have a robust assessment framework in place to address this requirement in a comprehensive manner. Planners need a way to more fully understand how their programs support
U.S. national security, OSD, and COCOM level priorities, and a way to determine which programs and activities are having the most significant impact. Two key themes to consider when developing an
assessment framework are resources
processes — i.e., the ends, ways, and means of building partner capacity. The actual assessment
resources and processes is, in itself, a key element to consider in successfully executing BPC programs and activities.
1. Program managers should implement the seven-step framework outlined in Chapter Five as a way to assess the effectiveness of DoD
programs. The assessments should be conducted in coordination with the geographic COCOMs, and we recommend that the analysis be conducted at the program level, using
specific countries as test cases. Having a better understanding of how DoD programs and specific activities are supporting COCOM and
OSD objectives will enable resource managers to make informed decisions about whether to expand, continue as is, alter in some way, or cut an existing activity that is falling short of its
objectives. As Chapter Five points out, DoD manages and executes programs across all of the “ways”; this type of framework would allow for individual programs to be aggregated into an assessment
across these various ways.
2. Both performance and effectiveness measures should be developed that link the relevant combating WMD ends, ways, and means.
Activity after-action reports that reflect or address those metrics should be shared with the geographic COCOM J5 Combating WMD and Theater Security Cooperation offices.
In addition, it would be useful for planners to better understand the effects of other agencies’ security cooperation activities
that are pursuing the same ends, especially those that involve support from DoD programs. Finally, program managers should seek feedback from partner countries through both free-flowing
discussions and focused surveys based on agreed-upon metrics.
3. In terms of
resources, DoD might consider creating a single resource advocate for combating WMD BPC programs. The advocacy for various programs should occur as a result of a detailed assessment described
in this monograph. Program managers can assist the advocate by providing visibility on various
programs; such collaboration can serve as a resource multiplier.
4. In terms of
implementation, we recommend that planners
and program managers consider a pilot assessment consisting of one or two key DoD programs that focus on several different “ways” of security cooperation (i.e., perhaps one training program and
another that focuses on exercises, equipment transfer, or workshops).
The seven-step assessment process outlined in Chapter Five provides a road map for planners to carry out the assessment at the
program level. The lessons of such an assessment could be applied to future assessment efforts, and the output and outcome indicators can also be adjusted as a result.
5. Program managers should consider whether the planned activities address gaps identified through the four-step process. This would
require a higher level of visibility into the ongoing activities than is currently available in a single source. Overall, DoD should emphasize the coordinated use of complementary projects when
possible, assist in the creation of common regional practices, support others’ programs when deemed appropriate, and understand when to stand aside.
The ideas presented in this chapter, and in the monograph as a whole, are an essential first step for DoD to enhance the
effectiveness of its efforts to build partner capacity to combat WMD. The recommendations
discussed above form a potentially useful construct for outlining the key issues and questions, and implementation options. DoD’s organizational
issues will play an important role in whether these options are feasible in the short term. Over the long term, these issues should not stand in the way of efforts to improve BPC to combat WMD
through strong linkages to U.S. and partner security interests and enhanced visibility, coordination, collaboration, and assessments that lead to better program implementation and resource
Source : http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG783.pdf