La France a donné lundi 21 décembre 2009 un coup de fouet à son partenariat nucléaire avec la Chine grâce à des transferts de technologie annoncés par le Premier ministre français lors d'une visite officielle à Pékin.

François Fillon, accompagné en Chine d'Anne Lauvergeon, présidente du directoire d'Areva, et d'Henri Proglio, nouveau P-DG d'EDF, a souligné lors d'une cérémonie l'importance et l'histoire de la coopération franco-chinoise dans le nucléaire civil.

" Le nucléaire est plus que jamais un thème fondamental du dialogue franco-chinois ", a-t-il dit dans l'imposante enceinte du Grand palais du peuple, sur la place Tiananmen de Pékin.

" Pour la France, c'est un honneur et une fierté d'avoir pu contribuer à la maîtrise de la technologie nucléaire par la Chine, au cours d'un partenariat initié il y a presque 30 ans ", a-t-il ajouté.

Paris et Pékin ont le projet de former ensemble des ingénieurs nucléaires et de construire sur le sol chinois une usine de retraitement des combustibles.

Les deux réacteurs de troisième génération EPR en construction dans la province de Guangdong ont aussi connu une nouvelle avancée avec la signature entre la holding chinoise CGNPC d'une part, Areva et EDF d'autre part, de deux coentreprises.

La TNPC, formée pour 30% par EDF et 70% par la China Guangdong nuclear power group (CGNPG), qui fait partie de CGNPC, sera en charge de la construction et de l'exploitation durant 50 ans de ces deux EPR situés à Taishan, dans le sud de la Chine.

L'investissement d'EDF dans cette coentreprise est de 600 millions d'euros selon le quotidien Les Echos.

Areva détiendra en outre 45% de Wecan, coentreprise qu'elle formera avec le CGNPC pour l'ingéniérie des réacteurs de Taishan, a annoncé Anne Lauvergeon.

Le groupe nucléaire français et son partenaire Dongfang ont également validé la vente pour 200 millions d'euros de pompes primaires pour des CPR 1000, réacteurs de deuxième génération.

Le premier EPR, dont la construction a été entamée en novembre, doit être opérationnel à la fin 2013 et le deuxième à la fin 2014.

Tranferts de technologie

Areva, d'abord réticent aux transferts de technologie, a fini par se plier aux exigences chinoises. Le groupe français a bataillé pour convaincre Pékin de la qualité de ses réacteurs de troisième génération et a été devancé dans un premier temps par Westinghouse, filiale du groupe japonais Toshiba Corp, qui a remporté un contrat de quatre réacteurs en 2007.

La Chine est en effet "le pays qui construit le plus grand nombre de réacteurs" au monde, a souligné François Fillon.

La République populaire compte 11 réacteurs en activité pour une capacité globale de production de 9,1 gigawatts (GW). Vingt-quatre nouveaux réacteurs représentant 25,4 GW sont actuellement en construction et, selon le China Daily, le gouvernement souhaite porter sa capacité à 86 GW d'ici 2020.

La France souhaite dorénavant travailler avec la Chine sur la quatrième génération d'EPR. Un milliard d'euros puisés dans le futur grand emprunt français seront consacrés à la recherche sur ces futurs réacteurs, " avec lesquels la gestion du cycle du combustible sera encore plus efficace ", a dit François Fillon.

" Le développement d'un secteur nucléaire durable et responsable, c'est pour notre coopération nucléaire un nouvel axe essentiel ", a-t-il ajouté.

L'alliance franco-chinoise dans le nucléaire se déclinera dans l'aval et dans l'amont de l'exploitation des réacteurs.

Un accord a été signé lundi entre l'université Sun Yat-Sen de Canton et un consortium de cinq écoles françaises pour l'ouverture l'an prochain d'une école franco-chinoise d'ingénieurs nucléaires.

Les deux pays ont aussi le projet d'une usine de retraitement des combustibles usés en s'appuyant sur la technologie française.

Executive Summary

Nanotechnologies are set to transform industrial society. Nanotechnologies allow for the manipulation of matter or creation of structures down to the molecular level (typically at a scale of approximately 100 nanometres or less, a nanometre being one- billionth of a metre). They promise benefits in a wide range of applications, from health care to food, cosmetics, chemicals, information technology and energy storage.

Nanomaterials are already being used in numerous consumer products, and more commercial applications can be expected in coming years. At the same time, a gap has emerged between the development of nanotechnologies and our understanding of how nanomaterials interact with the environment and the human body. Early results of research suggest that the safety of all nanomaterials cannot be taken for granted. The ongoing expansion of nanotechnologies may produce novel nanostructures that cause currently unknown forms of hazard. Developing nanomaterials governance that is both effective and proportional to potential risks is critical to the future success of existing and emerging nanotechnologies.

The European Union and the United States are worldwide leaders in the scientific and commercial development of nanotechnologies. Their regulatory responses to potential risks will send an important signal worldwide. In the past, they have cooperated in international efforts to harmonize their respective risk regulation, through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Where successful, such efforts have promoted high levels of protection while enabling scientists and industries to operate freely in the transatlantic economic space.

In some cases, however, transatlantic coordination and cooperation have proved difficult. Differences in legislative frameworks, regulatory cultures and societal risk perceptions can contribute to a divergence of regulatory responses. This was the case, for example, with high-profile transatlantic disputes over hormone-treated beef and genetically modified food, which have had a negative impact on transatlantic relations and trade. These experiences have shown the importance of identifying technological risks and promoting international cooperation at an early stage in the policy process.

This report aims to contribute to the debate on how best to address the risks of emerging nanotechnologies and how to promote coordinated and convergent approaches in the EU and US. It presents the main findings of a project that was carried out by a consortium of research institutions from both sides of the Atlantic: the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) in the UK, and the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) and the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in the United States.

The project was funded by a research grant from the European Commission, and is based on extensive consultation with experts and stakeholders in nanomaterials regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. It provides a detailed comparative analysis of EU and US regulatory frameworks in the key areas of chemicals, food and cosmetics, and identifies options and challenges for policy-makers and regulators in promoting greater transatlantic cooperation and convergence in nanomaterials regulation.

Regulatory challenges of nanomaterials

Governments in leading industrialized countries are currently relying on existing frameworks for environmental, health, and safety (EHS) regulation to deal with nanotechnology risks, making minor adjustments to specific regulations and their implementation in order to close any potential gaps or eliminate uncertainties. Regulators face a number of challenges in dealing with the potential risks of nanomaterials. These challenges are related to a series of uncertainties, with regard to the development and commercial application of nanomaterials, hazards and exposure pathways, the direction and speed of technological change, and the suitability and effectiveness of existing regulatory frameworks.

Rapid technological change. While the current regulatory focus is on passive nanomaterials, future developments will include active nanomaterials and are likely to converge with other technologies such as information, bio- and cognitive technologies. These future-generation nanomaterials will develop in ways that are difficult to foresee.

Regulators will need to constantly expand their knowledge base covering multiple areas of scientific and engineering inquiry and develop flexible responses to a constantly changing technological environment.

Uncertainty of commercialization paths. While the number of existing commercial products using nanomaterialskeeps growing, uncertainty exists regarding future commercialization paths. As the range of commercial applications expands, governments will have to address potential risks of nanomaterials in diverse regulatory contexts covering different industries and commercial applications, potentially adding to existing uncertainty about the regulatory coverage of nanomaterials risks.

Uncertainty regarding nanomaterials risks. A lack of data on hazards and exposure pathways of certain nanomaterials, combined with uncertainty about the applicability of some existing testing methods, are widely recognized impediments to the effective implementation of regulations. It is, therefore, too early to establish whether existing regulatory frameworks can and will be effective in the face of potential risks.

Uncertainty regarding the suitability of regulatory frameworks. Whether current laws provide adequate oversight for certain applications of nanotechnologies or whether new legislative instruments are needed depends very much on how existing statutes and regulations are implemented. Adequate guidance for implementation and the provision of the necessary resources for regulatory oversight thus become critical factors in developing effective regulatory responses.

Uncertainty regarding regulatory and scientific resources. The challenges that novel technologies such as nanotechnology present require significant investment in human resources. Statutes are a necessary but insufficient condition for success if the regulators lack enforcement capacity, scientific expertise and foresight. The public sector will increasingly have to compete with industry for talent in these emerging technology areas.

Towards regulatory effectiveness and convergence: policy recommendations

What should the EU and US do to promote more effective and convergent regulation of nanomaterials ? Below we present key policy-relevant findings of this project, based on our own research and consultations with relevant experts and stakeholders. We focus on three clusters of issues that we identified as the most important areas : the creation of the scientific building blocks that are necessary for risk assessment; the closure of existing knowledge gaps with regard to the commercialization of nanomaterials and potential EHS risks; and questions of societal and ethical perspectives and how they are addressed in risk management. We conclude with an outlook on the global challenges of developing nanomaterials regulation in a world of internationally integrated markets and new nanotechnology producers in emerging economies.

Creation of scientific building blocks

Nearly all experts whom we consulted agreed on the need to establish a firm scientific basis for risk assessment.

Many of the scientific building blocks, with regard to definition and characterization of nanomaterials, metrology and testing methods, are as yet missing or have not been internationally standardized. Developing common practices in these areas is a critical step towards more effective regulation; they are key building blocks of risk assessment.

Regulators and experts in the US, Europe and elsewhere are currently seeking to fill existing gaps by working together in various international forums. Our research suggests that ongoing work on creating scientific building blocks for risk assessment needs to be stepped up and expanded if it is to produce results in a timely fashion. The rapid pace of commercialization of nanomaterials demands a greater sense of urgency in this area.

The OECD enjoys broad legitimacy in promoting coordination on the building blocks for risk assessment, and is a central institution in the context of transatlantic regulatory convergence. At the same time, more political energy and resources need to be invested in the OECD process and greater transparency and inclusiveness should be achieved in its work.

Closing knowledge gaps

Furthermore, regulators face two important knowledge gaps, with regard to the EHS risks associated with the production and use of nanomaterials, and the presence of nanomaterials in commercial products. These two dimensions of uncertainty are closely linked and complicate the search for effective regulatory answers. Knowing as soon as possible what types of nanoscale products are on the market, what types of nanomaterials are used and how they move through possible product life-cycles provides some grounding for establishing research needs in the field of EHS risks. Uncertainty in both these areas afflicts US and EU regulatory systems in equal measure. Transatlantic cooperation on reducing uncertainty with respect to the commercial use of nanomaterials and on EHS risks would help both sides in addressing certain regulatory challenges.

Accordingly, as a matter of priority, governments on both sides of the Atlantic need significantly to increase funding for research into EHS risks of nanomaterials. International research coordination has its limits and can be difficult to achieve, but the benefits of improved transatlantic coordination of EHS research outweigh the costs.

Against the background of strained public finances and urgent research needs, enhanced transatlantic cooperation would give a greater sense of strategic direction to existing research efforts and strengthen the basis for sustained research funding streams into the future.

Furthermore, we encourage regulators and policy-makers to explore all options available to them, whether through domestic reform or international agreement, for promoting better information-sharing of EHS risk-related data on nanomaterials that ensures commercially sensitive data remain protected.

A second knowledge gap concerns the state of the commercialization of nanomaterials. Many companies themselves are uncertain about the use of such materials within their own industry, and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have acknowledged that they currently do not have comprehensive knowledge about their presence in commercially traded goods. Recently introduced voluntary substances reporting programmes are unlikely to close such knowledge gaps.

Given the persistence of these knowledge gaps, governments on both sides of the Atlantic should strengthen existing mandatory reporting requirements and, where necessary, create new ones, with a view to gaining a comprehensive overview of the commercial use of nanomaterials. Given the high degree of economic interdependence between the US and EU, any effort to enhance market transparency through improved reporting schemes would benefit from a coordinated effort by both sides.

Risk management and consumer labelling

Efforts to promote international coordination and cooperation are currently focused on establishing the scientific building blocks needed for risk assessment. In comparison, transatlantic coordination efforts on risk management are likely to be less productive, may be premature, and would face greater obstacles. At the same time, the internationalization of the nanosciences and nanotechnologies will inevitably bring any differences in risk management approaches into sharper focus in transatlantic relations. As more and more nanomaterials are adopted commercially and enter global supply chains, differences in national or regional risk management approaches may end up complicating the free flow of goods across national boundaries. For this reason, coordination in the area of risk management will need to be given greater prominence on the international agenda in the coming years.

One important but controversial element of risk management is consumer labelling. So far, neither the US nor the EU has introduced legally binding consumer labelling requirements that specifically target nanomaterials, but moves are under way, particularly in the EU, to introduce such technology-specific labelling systems and some limited labelling requirements already exist, e.g. in food regulation. Our interviewees expressed strongly divergent views on the need to go beyond this state of affairs by creating more comprehensive labelling requirements, and on whether more convergent approaches could and should be developed in this area.

In the light of the contentious nature of labelling, in terms of its general necessity and specific form of implementation, we conclude there is no overwhelming case for arguing that the US and EU should prioritize international efforts to create new, mandatory, labelling requirements or harmonize existing ones at this time. But US and EU authorities should explore the implications of potentially diverging consumer labelling requirements for nanomaterials, particularly in the context of international trade obligations.

Furthermore, if the US and EU were to explore the possibility of developing common approaches or standards for nanomaterials labelling, such an undertaking should involve a multi-stakeholder forum to engage relevant groups from industry and civil society in order to give full weight to the different commercial and ethical concerns. Such an effort would be less urgent than the creation of common building blocks for risk assessment, but is nevertheless important in its own right.

Addressing global dimensions

No efforts have been undertaken as yet to create a formal, treaty-based, international framework for nanomaterials regulation. Our research suggests little if any interest in pursuing the more ambitious objective of creating an international treaty on nanomaterials regulation. The political energies that would need to be invested in such a project are better spent on strengthening existing forums for international coordination and adjusting domestic regulatory frameworks where needed. Given the globalized nature of nanotechnological developments and commercialization, however, one cannot rule out the possibility that such a need for an international framework treaty might arise in the future, particularly as new players from the developing world are emerging in the global nanotechnology business.

In view of the ongoing and accelerating globalization of nanotechnologies, the EU and the US should perceive the global governance challenges arising from nanomaterials in broader terms. The OECD serves an important function as a forum for coordination among leading industrialized countries, but its work should be complemented by the development of international governance capacity in other areas, and there should be greater inclusion of developing countries. Other international organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), play important roles in their respective areas of global environmental protection and health promotion, but are only just beginning to identify the EHS risks of nanomaterials as emerging areas of concern. The current imbalance in the development of international governance capacity should thus be redressed, not least to ensure that developing countries are better represented in global regulatory cooperation.

... / ...

The complete report :  14692_r0909_nanotechnologies.pdf

1. Nanoscience and nanotechnology: accelerated development

    
   Nanoscience and nanotechnology (N&N) constitute new approaches to research and development (R&D), studying phenomena and human manipulation of matter at atomic, molecular and macromolecular level, at which the matter displays very different properties from those observed at larger scales. R&D and innovation in the field of N&N are at the origin of progress in a wide range of sectors. This progress may provide a response to the needs of citizens and make a contribution to the competitiveness and to the sustainable development objectives of the Union, and further a great many of its policies, such as public health, health and safety at work, the information society, energy, transport, security and space.
   
   This is particularly true of an area which is still little-known but emerging at a steady pace, from cross-fertilisation in research carried out in the areas of nanoscience, nanotechnology, biotechnology, life sciences, information technology, communications technology and cognitive science: the scope par excellence of the 'converging technologies', still known as NBIC (the acronym which now denotes the scientific area which involves nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science).
   
   The uncertainties entailed in the exponential development of the scientific activities, innovations and usages involved in this field are now central to long-term international reflection, particularly in the United States and Europe.

2.  
   "While N&N is bringing about important advantages and benefits for our society that improve our quality of life, some risk is inherent, as for any technology, and this should be openly acknowledged and investigated upfront (...) health, safety and environmental risks that may be associated with products and applications of N&N need to be addressed upfront and throughout their life cycle". (Cf. The Communication COM(2005) 243 of 7 June 2005 of the European Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee entitled "Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology: European Action Plan for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (2005 - 2009)").

   
   With regard more specifically to security defined in terms of the security of people and of heritage- individual and collective- and of fundamental freedoms -public and private- although nanotechnology helps reinforce the means to fight against crime, terrorism and other acute forms of criminality, at the same time it arms those who intend to commit crimes of this kind and/or denials of democracy, seriously infringing fundamental freedoms. However, although the authorities responsible for the protection and controls in this field are able to manage visible processes, they have little power over the invisible or intangible processes, particularly those which could seriously damage fundamental freedoms.

   
   With the coming of N&N generally, therefore, and more specifically with the emergence of converging new technologies working towards a hybridisation between the natural and the artificial, there is also an increased and very real risk (and not just deviance) for security as well as for fundamental freedoms.

   
   The emergence of nanotechnology, and the associated risks and threats, in fact reveals a disharmony, a phase difference between, on the one hand, truth as portrayed by science, keeping the greatest possible distance from ideology and dogma and, on the other, the ideals of progress, development, freedom, equality, solidarity, security and justice, but also of power, born of a collective conscience and a cultural and political dynamic ceaselessly at work.

   
   The coming of the Internet, as a result of electronic microchips and then nanochips, played its part in turning international relations and the instruments of international regulation upside down and, consequently, the foreign and security policies of the States, their mechanisms and their instruments. David Howell (former British Energy and Transport Minister) said: "From the mid-1970s on, a succession of events made the old international agenda obsolete. The Cold War is now a memory even if its traumatic scars linger, and a mosaic of ethnic and nationalistic quarrels has long since replaced its old ideological divide. Power has shifted between capitals but has also been dispersed into internet linkages which have empowered almost half the human race, with still more communications innovations just ahead. These developments have shaken the international institutions of the 20th century to their foundations. The United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Trade Organisation, NATO and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, to name only the most prominent, have all come under intense scrutiny as to their purpose, structure and relevance. Neither the EU nor the political structures within its member states, have escaped the waves of questioning now reaching into almost every corner of human affairs and governance. This massive fluidity in international affairs confronts policymakers and those who would build more secure global structures with a set of entirely new complexities. For the EU, searching for a more focussed global and better co-ordinated role while at the same time trying to settle its own future, the situation presents challenges that are particularly acute". (See his article "How the microchip is changing the face of foreign policy", which is published at www.europesworld.org).

   
   Extremely rapid development in a great many segments of human activity in nanotechnology and its uses, and the rapid development of converging NBIC technologies comes into this new context, symptomatic of the state of the world, and of international relations as things stand and are likely to remain during the first decades of the 21st century.

   
   NBIC-type technology itself is therefore becoming a factor of power and of strategic competition, which makes it likely to rear its head in proliferation, whilst the risks and threats that go with it, the nature of which may vary enormously, are not merely a matter for defence and security professionals, but are also of relevance to, more globally, the populations themselves, the species, life and, more broadly, nature in its biodiversity.

   
   Recent progress in the knowledge of human psychic, neuronal and immune processes, together with advances in genomics, prototype weaponry using converging nanotechnologies (or, at the very least, technologies involving either characteristics of nanometrics and biology, or characteristics of nanometrics and information technology) already favour the emergence of new opportunities, whilst at the same time giving rise to fears of the emergence and multiplication of risks and threats of another kind, which could jeopardise the security and defence systems of the States. The prospective development of autonomous military robots sheds much light on these fears.

   
   The ultra-miniaturisation of smart embedded electronic systems already allows the design, development, production and use, under operational conditions, of miniature drones with artificial intelligence- the size of an insect- and intelligent, communicating sensors, meaning that their servers do not need to be physically present in situ, whilst also allowing them to benefit from unparalleled agility and stealth, due to this miniaturisation taken to extremes, allowing high levels of agility, penetration and invulnerability. In addition, synthetic biology will give anyone able to master simulations and the scientific calculation of high-performance (vital) the potential to develop nano-biological threats which are as violent as they are unsuspected, in spite of the treaties in force. When integrated into ultra-mobile systems such as missiles, their effects on peace and security will be 'deterritorialised' (which will mean that everywhere in the world, any individual, any heritage, any sanctuary will be a potential target) and, at the same time, increased to planetary level by proliferation which knows no geographical borders and does not recognise the intangible borders of the restrictions of international law.

   
   These few examples shed some light on a number of future characteristics of the strategic and security environment as could result from a hazardous development of converging technologies; hazardous because insufficiently prepared, accompanied, piloted, mastered, regulated and/or controlled by the international institutions responsible for maintaining international peace and security, NATO (transformation process), and bodies within the European Union dedicated to the development of technological policy, and foreign and security policy- including weaponry capability.

   
   One might go so far as to say we are observing nothing less than the emergence of a new factor in military power and economic domination, equivalent to control over fire, the discovery of iron, the development of sailing ships, the invention of the internal combustion engine, machine-tools, nuclear energy and information and communication technologies in their time. We must now acknowledge that a hegemonic player will never have just one strategy, to go as far as possible and hold everybody else back, at the risk of seriously damaging safety and security.

   
   Given the unprecedented opening-up of a new technology on offer which is as abundant as it is unregulated, a technology which is increasingly available as access to the most revolutionary innovations has become commonplace. Ease of access has become amplified by economic and commercial competition surrounding products with an extremely high technological density. Controlling this access (to say nothing of the problem of equal access), and the issues of its use how this use is controlled are on the table.

   
   Wisdom dictates that one should not allow oneself to be overtaken by the unbridled progress of science and technology pushed by speculative movements of complex causes and uncertain goals, whilst at the same time striving not to open Pandora's box or unchaining Prometheus! However, the collective awareness of all or part of the potential challenges, both in terms of opportunities and of risks or threats, of this kind of technological effervescence is only recent, and has been little diffused within political, administrative, economic, financial, scientific, civilian or military elites. This is starting to develop within certain international organisations and fora (UN, UNESCO, World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union, the World Economic Forum in DAVOS).

   
   It remains to be verified whether this awareness has penetrated the fora and other bodies working for the establishment, implementation and monitoring compliance with international conventions on bans or limitations on the design, development, production, use or transfer of certain categories of weapons, goods, materials and technologies which are particularly critical in this regard (particularly in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear fields- CBRN) and of the associated legal acts in place. Indeed, the unique properties attached to the physics and chemistry of materials at nanometric scale could bring in case studies of a new type which has not yet been covered, or not covered enough, by the various regimes and treaties in force.

   
   Regulatory stakes in relation to the converging NBIC-type technologies

   
   Today, the issue of whether or not there is a need for rules and regulations is increasingly relevant: the prospects are worrying enough to justify a normative effort, at the risk of a greater or lesser delay in the dissemination of innovations, to limit and/or control access to or the use of these, even though there is by no means unanimous agreement over the need for recourse to a system of governance.

   
   The international community must show great vigilance and, by means of national legislation and international law, prevent, without disproportionately hindering the functioning of international commerce and the transfer of technologies which is vital to a globalised economy, the design, development, production, sales and transfer of articles, matter, substances, goods and technologies which may be used to create technologies which give rise to fears of proliferation, as is currently the case in the registers.

   
   As Alain Joxe said in his publication entitled "La globalisation stratégique": "The erosion of all nation-States by the assaults of neo-liberal deregulation leaves the interdependence of the bulk violence of the new armaments and the mathematicised economy exposed. A new anthropology of the interaction of collective identities within conflictual, economic and military relations is needed" (our translation).

   
   The French President Nicolas Sarkozy has on several occasions stressed the need and the urgency to carry out a full renovation of the global system of governance with regard to the overall objectives laid down by the political decision-makers regarding international governance and regulation: "what is radically new about our time is that in spite of our different traditions and cultures, in spite of the reaffirmations of individual identities, the world has created its unity, our humanity is now one. The threats it is faced with are global. The responses will be global. The questions being put to the leaders of our time are weighty ones: will we, collectively, be able to give the responses needed to avoid the declines which would be fatal and continue humanity's march onward (...). We can no longer accept that programmes paid for by some are effectively dismantled by the decisions of others, due to a lack of coordination, or even disagreement, over the objectives" (our translation). (Conference of the ambassadors of 26 August 2009).

   
   This need and this urgency are keenly felt in the field of new nanometric technologies, as regards considerations which affect both security and defence issues. The objective of regulating the converging technologies is to create conditions in order to inspire "sustainable confidence" regarding the general safety of research and innovation activities in this sector, whose outlines are as fluid as they are extensive, and regarding the safety of derivative products and usages which could potentially feature in the fields of security and defence. This confidence is vital, not only to allow the international research and innovation movement to continue- a sine qua non condition for the creation of new knowledge and new sources of progress, growth, development and the economic and commercial competitiveness of goods and services with high levels of added value- but also for the credibility of the security strategies and systems deployed by the States.

   
   We have also to agree on the fields which may be covered by regulation of this kind, which must, of necessity, vary between the States and regions of the world.

   
   However, we must note that ideas are opposed to the terms and conditions of regulation of this kind, from the most restricted to the most permissive, and including self-regulation. Some countries will be more inclined to use laws and regulations, others prefer standards, others again will be open to proposals of international governance from institutions following the ranges of activities and finally, yet other, more "liberal" countries, will go no further than to implement codes of conduct and similar formulae, which are not, by their nature, legally binding.

    

   To this end, it has become vital to seek initially to create the conditions for the most realistic possible bottom line in terms of the 'risks' and 'benefits' of this development of the world, based around the coming nanometric dimension and, secondly, the conditions for regulation in line with the security and defence objectives previously laid down at the various relevant levels (international/multilateral, regional/European, national).
   
   ... / ... (cf. The overlapping stakes of security, defence and international responsibility in the field of convergent NBIC-type technologies (2) )
   
   Dossier published by Agence Europe : EUROPE/Documents No. 2525 : The overlapping stakes of security, defence and international responsibility in the field of convergent NBIC-type technologies 
   
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   Other papers about this issue (only in french language) :
   
    * Nouvelles sciences et technologies : enjeux de sécurité et problématique de responsabilité internationale 
    * L'évaluation des risques nanotechnologiques / Assessing the risks in nanotechnology 
    * A la recherche d'une pensée et d'une action politiques à la hauteur des défis globaux ! 
    * Du besoin de gouvernance des activités bio et nanotechnologiques convergentes 
    * UNESCO / : Commission Mondiale d'Ethique des Connaissances Scientifiques et des Technologies : Rapport sur l'Ethique des Sciences 
    * Risky business ? The EU, China and dual-use technology, by May-Britt Stumbaum (EUISS) 
    * Débat public sur les options générales en matière de développement et de régulation des nanotechnologies