The EU’s strategic compass for security and defence: Just another paper? By Nicole Koenig

Recommendations

The member states should keep the central objective in mind: to concretise the EU’s political level of ambition for the area of security and defence. They should resist tendencies to broaden the focus or engage in fruitless meta-debates. Instead, they should aim to develop a concise security and defence sub-strategy of the Global Strategy that addresses some of the concrete, thorny questions listed in table 2. In this process, the political leadership and impetus of the four subsequent Council presidencies will be essential. They should closely coordinate their agendas and aim for a clearer delineation of the process considering extant strategic documents.

A narrower focus on security and defence does not imply keeping the Commission out of the equation. On the contrary, it should be closely associated in the talks on all four baskets. The member states and Commission should, for instance, use the process as an opportunity to clarify what the Commission’s contribution could be to PESCO and its role in strategy-driven capability development via the European Defence Fund.

The EEAS and the member states should make sure that the agreed document is properly followed up. On the one hand, this could include an updated Security and Defence Implementation Plan. On the other, the strategic compass should lead to a clearer definition of the EU’s military level of ambition. The member states should use the opportunity to revise the EU Headline Goal, which as well as being outdated, has never been met. Both scenarios and capability requirements should be closely coordinated with NATO.

Finally, the member states should aim for regular revision. Both the threat analysis and the strategic compass should be revised at the start of each new institutional cycle. Updating the strategic compass every five years would also allow for a systematic assessment of how it is being implemented. The update could be aligned with the priorities formulated by the European Council and provide fresh impetus to the Brussels-based bureaucracy.

Conclusion

The strategic compass process represents a real and timely opportunity. It should address key and long-standing weaknesses of EU security and defence policy: It could lead to more convergent threat perceptions, clarify the level of ambition, provide political guidance for the EU’s military capability development, enhance coherence between the EU’s supranational and intergovernmental bodies and ultimately shape a common strategic culture.

However, there are reasons why these weaknesses have been long-standing amid doubts as to whether a two-year process in the wake of a global pandemic can lead to a breakthrough. The single most important concern is that it will simply produce another piece of paper with few practical implications. This policy paper provides an overview of the risks underlying this concern.

When further defining scope, process and output, the member states should learn from the past and make sure that both stages of the process are properly followed up. The Coronavirus crisis highlighted the vulnerability and interdependence of European societies while underlining the importance of an enhanced ability to act together globally. In this increasingly volatile and polarised geopolitical context, the EU would be well advised to agree on a common strategic compass that is worth much more than the paper it is written on.

Read the Policy Paper : The EU’s strategic compass for security and defence: Just another paper?