European Union : The difficulty of implementing permanent structured cooperation (PSC)

The reason for my coming back to permanent structured cooperation (PSC) today is that I have noticed a certain amount of wavering in the will to implement major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. And then there is misunderstanding, if not attempts to even hijack or disparage these new instruments at this particularly sensitive time.

One of the errors that frequently crop up is the idea that there could be several permanent structured cooperations. And yet, Article 46 of the Treaty on the European Union and the Protocol on PSC constantly use, in the French version, a definite article implying that there can only be one PSC (unlike enhanced cooperations).  English mother-tongue friends have assured me that the English text leads to the same conclusion. I am unable, of course, to verify every linguistic version and place my trust in the jurist-linguists who carried out the work. At any rate, debates within the Convention and then intergovernmental conferences have never brought such uniqueness into doubt. So why this lengthy preamble?  Because some people now seem tempted to use this misinterpretation of the text to present permanent structured cooperation as another form of variable geometry, after the fashion of member state participation in EU operations and category B projects of the European Defence Agency.  Basing their suppositions on the principle that this is already being done, they unhesitatingly conclude that the PSC is obsolete … before it has even seen light of day!

Under such circumstances, I find it essential to point out that PSC was conceived to allow a group of member states, that are willing to avail themselves of the necessary means, to form a vanguard for European defence, until we reach the point when conditions finally come together to set up real common defence.  Nonetheless, this “one-shot gun” (to use another’s expression) is to be handled with caution.  The seminar organised by the Spanish Presidency for March will no doubt shed more light on the matter. More time will be needed, however, to answer all the questions raised by PSC and ensure its correct implementation.

The question of degree of openness and criteria for participation remains unresolved. Low criteria (for example, percentage of GDP devoted to defence or the share of the budget allocated to equipment and/or research) would promote very broad participation but would not drive capabilities development forward. On the other hand, over-high criteria would lead to PSC being limited to the restricted club of countries that already invest the most in defence. This choice is all the more difficult as member states’ capacity of engagement is constrained by the current economic crisis. Once the criteria and the participants are known, it will still be necessary to organise this vanguard and ensure it is able to operate in a coherent way with the rest of CSDP.

There is still the risk that some countries want to be part of PSC simply to hold back the vanguard in its ardour. Our British friends already apply this kind of damper. The European Defence Agency is a striking example of this. The Treaty imposes unanimity but it seems difficult to establish a criterion solely aimed at excluding the United Kingdom. It would be pointless to launch a vanguard to have it paralysed immediately after. So what should be done? Some suggest waiting for better days, while others say this intergovernmental  instrument should be discarded, and Community levers sought to gradually increase solidarity in defence between member states. Reflection on this has only just begun.

Source : EUROPE DIPLOMACY & DEFENCE n°293 - 11 February 2010